THE DEUS OTIosus THEORY Deus otiosus. Deus remotus, Deus incognitus, Deus incertus and Deus
absconditus are all too familiar epithets that have been used by some scholars in describing the Supreme Being in African traditional religion to indicate the idea of his nonactive involvement in the affairs of the world and hence the basis of infrequent sacrifice to him. It is important to note that the question is not that of worshipping God in general, or offering him sacrifice at all, but rather that of not sacrificing frequently to him.
According to Raphaele Pettazzoni who proposed this theory in 1922:
Otiositas itself belongs to the essential nature of creative beings, and is in a way the complement of their creative activity. The world once made, and the cosmos established, the creator's work is as good as done. Any more intervention on his part would not only be superfluous, but possibly dangerous, since any change in the cosmos might let it fall back into chaos. 3 Thus, for Pettazzoni, the 'idleness' of the creative Supreme Being, which is the basis for his not being worshipped frequently, arises not so much from his character as Supreme Being as from his character as creator.
Pettazzoni's explanation has the merit of focusing on the creative function of God, and provides insight for distinghuising God's creative activity from his administrative activity. However, his conclusion to the otiositas of God is not admissible. He is in fact led to this conclusion by the traditional Western concept of creation4 according to which the work of creation ended with the pronouncement of the Biblicalfiat and the fashioning of man as recorded in the Book of Genesis. What God had next to do was to conserve the world and provide for it. Thus three divine functions are distinghuished in traditional Western theology-creation, conservation and providence, providence being often regarded as part of conservation. By creation God brought things into being, by conservation he keeps them in being and gives them the capacity to thrive according to their species and individuality, and by providence he procures what is necessary for their existence and cares for them.
For most African peoples however, the situation is slightly different. Two divine functions -creation and governance -are distinguished. While God involves the gods and the ancestors in all aspects of governing the world, he does not however so involve them in creation (though according to some African peoples like the Yoruba, he may give a particular creative function to a particular god).5 And in African thought generally, creation connotes a lot more than the traditional Western concept would permit. In general, creation in African thought implies that God having initiated the work of creation continues to bring new beings into existence and to keep them alive. Thus divine creative power continues to be active in the universe. Attention must be drawn to the fact that we are here concerned not with the scientific correctness or wrongness of the African's view of creation and procreation but rather with the fact that his view is different from the Westerner's. And the difference lies in that the African's view of creation when properly understood and interpreted is much more dynamic and present than the traditional Westerner's. This aspect of African people's thought, which is also common among most preliterate peoples, does not seem to have been properly grasped by some early anthropologists. Africans generally believe in the presence of God's creative power in all beings including trees and even stones.' This was wrongly interpreted by some early anthropologists to mean animism. Later researchers were able to put a better interpretation on it. Among such later researchers is Placide Tempels who reached a philosophical formulation of this fact in his theory of 'vital force' which is the bed-rock of much of African philosophy today. Creation is, therefore for the African, a continuous activity on God's part. Through it God makes his power and presence felt in the world. From this it becomes immediately evident that the Deus otiosus theory is most inadequate for explaining God's nature as creator in the context of African religious thought.
The Deus otiosus theory reached its peak of popularity around the middle of this century with the researches of Mircea Eliade. The Eliadean analysis is based on the 'Sky god' concept-the belief that God is too distant or too good to need any worship properly so called. According to Eliade, Africans and most 'primitive' peoples identify the Supreme Being as the sky god. They acknowledge his autonomy, his majesty and primacy. But man easily forgets him as "the hardships of life drive him to look more towards earth rather than towards heaven, and ... he only discovers heaven's importance when he is threatened with death from that direction". Being thus in the sky (a symbol of passivity and transcendence) the Supreme Being is in cult substituted for by other religious forms-the divinities and ancestors who are more dynamic, active and easily accessible. Thus man gradually moves away from the Supreme Being, substituting the lesser gods for him and "every substitution marks a victory for the dynamic, dramatic forms, so rich in mythical meaning, over the Supreme Being of the sky who is exalted but passive and remote". Eliade acknowledges that these peoples do worship God occasionally and that the scant worship given to God "indicates purely and simply that the mass of religious practice is given over to other religious forms; in no case does it indicate that such sky gods are the abstract creations of primitive man (or simply of his "priests"), or that he has not had, or been able to have, any real religious relationship with them". 8 This analysis is most significant for bringing out certain important and basic facts about the Supreme Being in African thought and it represents an advance on the Pettazzonian analysis. The facts presented here are that the Supreme Being is not a figment of the imagination, that he is not an abstraction, but a person capable of maintaining a personal relationship with man and actually maintaining such a relationship, and that he is worshipped, though not frequently. From this analysis then, one basic aspect of God's personality (in African thought) stands out clearly-that he is distant yet near to man.
Eliade's interpretation of these facts however leaves much to be desired. To picture the situation which Eliade does, as that in which the more dynamic lesser gods are gradually substituted for God in worship, is, as Professor Idowu well puts it, to present a scene in which Deity and divinities are involved in a coup d'itat whereby Deity is the loser, but is somehow allowed a consolation status of being approached or addressed on rare occasions if he behaves himself and keeps away and does not seek by his all-power to disrupt the machinery of the universe which is firmly in the hands of the divinities. 9 The Eliadean interpretation does not seem to know or take seriously the fact that Africans generally look on the lesser divinities as creatures of God appointed by Him to administer certain affairs in the world-a situation which puts God in absolute control, and therefore negates any idea of 'substitution' and 'victory' on the part of the lesser gods. That God is distant is undeniable, but that he was pushed away by the lesser gods is unacceptable. Neither is the fact of God's distance (transcendence) the basis of the scant worship given to him for if it were so, to be logical, he would not be worshipped at all, since he would be too transcendent for man's reach. Here we find in Eliade's explanation an obvious overemphasis on God's transcendence over and above his nearness (immanence) which is clearly expressed in God's personal relationship with man and in the presence of his continued creative activity on earth.
Eliade also posits God's goodness as an alternative basis for the scant worship given to him: He (the sky god) is too distant or too good to need worship properly so called, and they (African peoples) invoke him only in cases of extreme need ... "Why should we sacrifice to him?" said a native. "We do not need to fear him, for he does not do us any harm, as do the spirits of our dead (ovakuru)" ... He is so good and so kind that men have no need to fear him. 10 We do not question the authenticity of the above statement in quotation. What we question, however, is how such a statement is to be understood and interpreted. The impression given is that this is an anwer to a question that could be put thus: "Why do you not sacrifice to God often?" On its face value, the informant's answer would mean that God is good and therefore does not need frequent sacrifice. A close look, however, reveals that this sort of response is typical of West African informants, and is in fact not a direct . It is therefore always necessary, in the light of this explanation, to look at the structure of the response to get its meaning. In other words, the meaning of the response depends not so much on the question asked as on the structure of the response itself." Thus judging from its structure, the response under consideration merely repeats the information available within the system: that (frequent) sacrifice is not offered to God, that people do not need to fear God, that God does not do people harm, and that the spirits of the dead can harm people. To try to understand this as a logical reasoning for not sacrificing to God often is rather hazardous, not because the informant is incapable of making a logical statement, but rather because that is not what he is out to do. He is here not trying to formulate a syllogism, for in this particular case doing so requires much more than what his culture permits. He thus mentally settles on giving particular concrete information.
On the whole the Eliadean analysis, as already stated, brings out some basic facts about God's relationship with man. Its weakness however lies in not being able to discover the balance between divine transcendence and divine immanence in African religious thought. And one could only expect this from a scholar who knows African religious thought inside out.
James O'Connell carries the Eliadean analysis further with adjustments. Instead of stressing "the exclusively abstract character of the sky God" which he says Eliade has done, he stresses rather the all-purity and all-powerfulness of the high God. This, according to him, made people uneasy about Him and resulted in the withdrawal of the high God. Against Eliade, he holds that the sky God was not pushed away by the lesser gods but withdrew of Himself. He also acknowledges that the sky God is not completely withdrawn as He can be approached in extreme necessity and is regarded as the author of morality, and that the gods are only expressions of His power.'2 By attributing the withdrawal of God to God Himself, O'Connell's analysis avoids the Eliadean mistake of putting the world under the control of the lesser gods. However, the process of the withdrawal as presented, gives the impression that too much has been concluded from a particular fact. God's withdrawal does not seem to follow logically from people's uneasiness about his allpurity. Rather it would have been more logical to say that people withdrew from God's presence because they felt uneasy about his allpurity. But such a logical conclusion would negate the Deus otiosus thesis which the author sought to propose, and so he had to use the illogical one.'" The point being made here is that O'Connell's conclusion does not fit his premise. And like Eliade, he does not integrate into his solution the fact of God's nearness to the people which he has observed.
The fact that God is seen to be all-holy and all-powerful and yet not completely withdrawn, which O'Connell's research makes clear, should indicate a need to re-examine the whole question of the withdrawn God and should point the way to another direction of research. Thus this theory, though still being maintained by a few'4 has been largely replaced today by the 'Mediumistic theory'.
THE MEDIUMISTIC THEORY
The propounders of the mediumistic theory hold that even though Africans do not offer sacrifice directly to God or do so only occasionally, all the sacrifices offered to the lesser gods, the spirits and the ancestors are offered ultimately to God. These beings are therefore intermediaries between God and man-through them man sacrifices to God.
The The mediumistic theory is indeed plausible and has attracted many African scholars but few seem to see the vital problems it presents. In its psychological model proposed by Booth, the gods are a mere fiction of the human mind and therefore have no real existence. This goes sharply contrary to the people's belief that these gods are real beings, creatures of God and really alive and active in the universe.23 Thus while the theory is a lofty attempt at explaining man's preoccupation to concretize to himself transcendent divine action, it does not however reflect the experience and aspirations of African peoples for whom these gods have external existence and relevance outside the human mind.
Within the sociological model of this theory (that is, the other explanations) which recognizes the reality of these gods, the question is: either these gods are recognized as free beings capable of initiating actions and carrying them through, and responsible for such actions and therefore meriting praise or blame, or they are mere instruments or channels without free will and responsibility. To say that the gods are both free beings and instruments does not make sense. An analogy from a human situation may make this clear. The minister of education in a nation serving under the president of that nation is a free and responsible person. He can initiate actions and accept praise or blame for such actions. Yet he was assigned that post by the president and serves under the president. The slave of the president, however, (if he has any) functions altogether differently. His freedom and responsibility are very limited and he can be 'used' as an 'instrument' by the master. His situation cannot therefore be compared with that of the minister, neither can he rightly be said to function both as a slave and as a minister. In the same way the gods cannot be thought of as functioning both as free responsible agents and as instruments. To reduce them to mere instruments poignantly contradicts the conceptions of many African peoples about the nature and function of these gods. For the Yoruba of West Africa, for example, conceive Orisd-nld, one of the gods of Yoruba pantheon, as having helped God in the work of creation, not as having been used by God as an instrument in creation. 24 The Igbo of Nigeria see Ala the earth goddess as one that gives fertility to both man and the soil. According to Victor C. Uchendu, "without her, life would be impossible for the Igbo who attach much sentiment to the land". 25 The Akan of Ghana, according to Busia, seek the gods "to grant health, or children, or prosperity in business, or protection from misfortune and from witches". According to the Ibibio of Nigeria, each god has a particular sphere of human life and affairs of which he is in charge. And in the words of Professor Idowu, "the divinities are ministers, each with his own definite portfolio in the Deity's monarchical government. Each is in his own sphere an administrative head of a department".26 All these go to show that these gods are not mere instruments butfree and responsible beings, indeed masters within their limited spheres and have a wide range of powers. They must therefore be seen as being responsible for their actions, meriting praise or blame, and capable of demanding, accepting or rejecting sacrifices without necessarily having to refer to God. It only becomes valid to talk of them as intermediaries when they are specifically requested to intercede before God on behalf of man. Yet they are creatures dependent on God for their existence just as any other creature.
The point being made here is, granting that these beings are or can be intermediaries between God and man, are they free and responsible intermediaries just as any human intermediaries between men are or are they mere passive instruments? If they are free and responsible (and most of the authors seem to admit they are)27 then they deserve to be thanked when they perform well and to be blamed when they perform badly (just as any human intermediary receives praise for a job well done and blame for one badly done). And sacrifice to them is one way of thanking them. This means that the gods ought to be considered not purely as a means to an end but as, at the same time, an end in themselves in some limited sense.
Among the Igbo as also among the Ibibio, the mediumistic theory is not borne out by any aspect of their sacrificial system. For neither the sacrificial structure nor the sacrificial rituals and prayers imply that every sacrifice is intended ultimately for God.28 And this can be said of most West African peoples for what we notice is that sacrifices are always addressed to specific spiritual beings29 and sometimes the gods and ancestors are explicitly requested to carry sacrifice to God and to intercede before God on behalf of man. 30 If such intermediary function were always implied in every sacrifice to the gods, it would of course be unnecessary to make it explicit sometimes.
If sacrifices be ultimately offered to God, what of those sacrifices that are offered to evil spirits? Among the Ibibio for example, such sacrifices are always contemptuous and are intended to ward off these spirits. Things offered in such sacrifices are generally not fit for human consumption and there is generally no sacrificial meal. To say that such sacrifices are ultimately intended for God is simply repugnant to the spirit of these people who would not want to offer a contemptuous sacrifice to God. It must be accepted then that these sacrifices are meant for these spirits. And if evil spirits can demand and have sacrifices for themselves, good spirits must likewise be thought to be capable of demanding and having sacrifices themselves.
Again among most West African peoples God is regarded as supremely good and cannot be thought of as author of evil. Among these peoples calamities like epidemic or famine are attributed to the gods, and sacrifices are offered to these gods to placate them. To say that such sacrifices are ultimately intended for God would mean saying that God is the cause of the epidemic or famine, and this is repugnant to these peoples' conception of God.
It must therefore be admitted that sacrifices offered to the gods and the ancestors are meant for them and not for God except when that is so specified. One important factor in any theoretical reflection is method. And one significant aspect about method is its relation with the object studied. A method states Paul Tillich, is not an "indifferent net" in which reality is caught, but the method is an element of the reality itself.33 This means in effect that to be appropriate the method for explaining African religious phenomena must incorporate the frame of reference of African culture within which such phenomena are intelligible.34 Our point of departure in a question like this must therefore always be a critical examination of the basic assumptions used in our explanation or reflection. African religious situations must be reflected upon within the African cultural context. In other words, an understanding of any African religious fact must always be sought first of all within the context of African world view and thought system. It is only after this that it is legitimate to attempt to relate such facts to Judaeo-Christian thought and practice.
It is indeed natural and spontaneous in the light of our JudaeoChristian background to posit as the valid premise in relation to our topic that since God is supreme, sacrifice should be offered to him alone or at least it should be offered more frequently to him than to other spiritual beings. In this light it becomes quite difficult to reconcile the idea of sparse sacrifice to the Supreme God with that of frequent sacrifice to the lesser spiritual beings. The Deus otiosus theory sought to explain this by eliminating God's active influence on earth, while the mediumistic theory sought to explain it by reducing the lesser spiritual beings to mere instruments. Both theories, as we have seen, go contrary to African conceptions. They arise as attempt to fit African traditional religious practice into the framework of a Judaeo-Christian model.
To understand why few sacrifices are offered to God by some African peoples, we must first of all enquire into what sacrifice means for them and then see how this meaning affects their relationship with God. We shall here base our argument on the sacrificial system of the Ibibio35 which in many respects is similar to that of other West African peoples. Sacrifice, and for that matter any ritual, is for the Ibibio primarily, though not exclusively, a means of establishing contact with the invisible world, and when offered to God it means an entry into the divine presence. Here we see that the understanding of the nature and function of sacrifice in Ibibio traditional religion differs from what it is in Judaeo-Christian religion. In the latter, sacrifice is the highest form of worship and so must be given to God alone. In Ibibio mentality however (and this holds good for many other West African peoples), cultic actions are not categorized in vertical terms of the higher and the lower but in qualitative terms of the more potent and the less potent. Thus sacrifice is conceived as a cultic action that is most potent in establishing communication with the spiritual beings. It is not therefore reserved for God alone but can be offered to all and any spiritual being when contact with such beings is required. Thus the Ibibio see no contradiction in offering sacrifice to God as well as to the gods and the ancestors.
It is necessary to understand the above premise in order to be able to grasp why the Ibibio and perhaps many other West African peoples do not sacrifice to God frequently. Next, we must have recourse to the people's social norms and practices in search of an appropriate analogy. For the Ibibio and those West African peoples who regard God as a king/chief, Idowu and Der have actually pointed the way to this by referring to the etiquette governing the relationship between the king and his subjects in African society whereby the ordinary subject may not treat the king with familiarity. This demands that the king may not be approached by the ordinary citizen except through an intermediary, that is in the company of an elder; it also demands that the king may not be approached or seen often by the ordinary citizen.36 The line of explanation chosen by Idowu and Der is the former. We propose however that the latter is a more appropriate analogy.
For an appropriate analogy, it is necessary that there be a 'correlation' of correspondence between the two realities." In this light, the analogy of approaching the king through an intermediary is seen to be inappropriate, because whereas in social life the king is never approached directly, in the religious context sacrifice is sometimes offered directly to God, as the authors who propose this line of explanation do themselves testify. Thus in addition to the reasons already given for rejecting the mediumistic theory, the par-ticular aspect of social etiquette on which it is based is here seen to be inadequate as well.
The other aspect of African social etiqutte (on which we base our explanation) is that the king should not be approached or seen often. Among the Ibibio and many other West African peoples the king/chief appears in public only occasionally and even so is among the Yoruba, often veiled.38 But generally it is for these peoples a mark of respect that the king/chief is not approached often by ordinary citizens. And indeed they do not need to go to him often. Yet this must not be interpreted as a lack of concern on the part of the king/chief for the welfare of his citizens nor as a lack of interest on the part of the people for their king/chief. For, the king/chief actually consults with his counsellors daily on the welfare of his subjects, and is kept well informed by the different lineage heads of what goes on in the kingdom. The people, too, show a lively interest in carrying out his orders. This for us is a more appropriate analogy for explaining why most West Africans do not sacrifice to God often. Sacrifice, as we have seen, means for the Ibibio entering into the divine presence. Prayers alone are considered as not sufficiently potent to bring man into the divine presence. For, as the Ibibio say, between God and man there is a ritual fence. In communicating with God through prayer, it is as if one were speaking to God over the fence. In communicating with God through sacrifice however, the ritual fence is removed and one enters into the presence of God, and to do that often is simply not acceptable.
CONCLUSION
We have tried to show in the above that as models for explaining the scant sacrificial worship given to God by some African peoples, the Deus otiosus theory and the mediumistic theory fall short of reflecting the reality of the situation at least among some West African peoples. We have also pointed to the analogy of Ibibio etiquette governing relationship between the king and his subjects as the direction where an appropriate explanation is to be sought. Unlike Idowu and Der, who locate the explanation in the aspect of such etiquette demanding that the king be approached through an intermediary, we locate it rather in the aspect demanding that the king be not approached often. This leads us to the conclusion that within the framework of Ibibio and many other West African religious thought and practice, it is perfectly in order that God is not given sacrifice frequently, and that it is indeed out of respect and decorum rather than anything else that this is so. NOTES 
